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Articles
The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights
Protection: An Alternative to
Antipoverty Arguments?
Noah D. Zatzt
This Symposium concerns "Civil Rights and the Low-Wage
Worker," and this Essay addresses the relationship between the
core concepts in that title: "civil rights" and "low wages." In what
way, if any, do low wages implicate the body of normative con-
cerns associated with civil rights and the body of law devoted to
vindicating those concerns? Minimum wage law plainly rests on
the notion that wages can be too low to be legally tolerable, and
so we might pose the question more concretely as follows: does
the minimum wage protect workers' civil rights?
By extending my recent work on antidiscrimination theory,1
I suggest that, yes, the minimum wage aims to remedy an injury
to workers' civil rights. If I am right, then much of the ongoing
debate about the minimum wage is fundamentally misframed.
t Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. For especially helpful comments and con-
versations, I thank Cheryl Harris, Frances Olsen, Jonathan Zasloff, Kirk Stark, Paul
Sonn, and Rick Abel, audiences at The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium
and at the Third Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor & Employment
Law, and the editors of the Legal Forum. I am grateful for valuable support from the
Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs and research assistance from
Hailey Loomis.
1 Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and
the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent (forthcoming 2009, Colum L Rev) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with U Chi Legal F).
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Antagonists in that debate largely take for granted that the min-
imum wage is an antipoverty policy and dispute its appropriate-
ness as a means to that end. My suggestion is that supporters of
the minimum wage may be right about the ultimate policy ques-
tion even if they are wrong to deny or evade many economists'
empirical claims about distributive and disemployment effects
relative to alternative antipoverty policies.
Conventional contemporary legal typologies, in contrast,
would answer "no."2 "Civil rights" most often is identified with
antidiscrimination law, or more broadly with legal responses to
inequality and subordination along lines of socially significant
group differences-race, sex, disability, and so on. 3 This body of
law is notoriously relative. To know whether one worker's wages
implicate civil rights concerns, we need to compare them to other
workers' wages. A corporate lawyer's pay may violate her civil
rights if a man would be paid more for the same job, even if both
far exceed the median wage for all workers. Inversely, the vastly
smaller amount paid to her firm's janitors would not be the con-
cern of a conventional civil rights lawyer so long as all janitors
are paid the same.4
The minimum wage appears to take a fundamentally differ-
ent approach and directly address what might be termed "eco-
nomic substance," evaluating working conditions in absolute
2 For instance, unlike employment discrimination, the minimum wage does not
appear as a topic in civil rights casebooks. See, for example, Theodore Eisenberg, Civil
Rights Legislation: Cases and Materials (LexisNexis 5th ed 2004); Charles F. Abernathy,
Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation: Cases and Materials (West 4th ed 2006). The
same holds true even in an innovative casebook addressing the intersection of race, gend-
er, and economic justice. See Emma Coleman Jordan and Angela P. Harris, Economic
Justice: Race, Gender, Identity and Economics (Foundation 2005). Within labor and em-
ployment law, employment discrimination typically is treated as a conceptually distinct
topic. See, for example, Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 Mich L Rev 1539
(2006); Marion G. Crain, Pauline T. Kim, and Michael Selmi, WorkLaw: Cases and Mate-
rials (LexisNexis 2005).
3 On the historical development of this understanding of civil rights in U.S. law, see
Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Harvard 2007). A different sense of
"civil rights"-one focused on access to civil contract and the courts-arises from T.H.
Marshall's influential analysis of citizenship in terms of political, civil, and social rights.
See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social
Class and Other Essays 1 (Cambridge 1950).
4 By using a private sector example governed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, I mean to emphasize that "civil rights" are not necessarily a matter of constitution-
al law in today's legal landscape. Nor is there is anything essentially nonconstitutional
about labor rights, as shown by recent scholarship on the evolving jurisprudence of the
13th Amendment. See Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (cited in note 3); Wil-
liam E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L J 165 (2001); James
Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 Colum L Rev 122 (2002).
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terms. At issue is the economic balance between workers and
their employers, not distinctions among an employer's workers.
At this level of abstraction, the minimum wage typically would
be grouped with other "minimum standards" concerning non-
wage benefits and protections. This kinship extends to labor
law's empowerment of workers acting in concert vis-A-vis their
employers, so as to rectify the underlying imbalance that yields
low labor standards.
This conceptual and institutional divide between "labor" and
"civil rights" has come under critical scrutiny, with a particular
focus on the contingent historical process through which the dis-
tinction emerged. Risa Goluboff's recent book The Lost Promise of
Civil Rights reveals a pre-Brown world in which leading civil
rights attorneys challenged Jim Crow as "a system of both racial
oppression and economic exploitation,"5 and in which African
American industrial workers facing exclusionary or segregated
shops complained to civil rights organizations in terms that "em-
phasized both the racial basis of the discrimination and the se-
vere economic consequences it visited on [them]. '"6 It remains
unclear, however, what the institutional manifestation would be
of a new labor/civil rights regime that addresses discrimination
and economic injustice in an integrated fashion. Nor is there a
well-formed normative foundation that fully integrates labor and
civil rights within a single conceptual framework, in contrast to a
"both/and" approach that keeps them conceptually distinct even
while emphasizing how they arise in concurrent, cumulative, or
mutually reinforcing ways.
This Essay aims to make a modest start down that much
longer path, and to stimulate others to join in, by considering the
narrower question of how the minimum wage might be justified.
In particular, I will do so in a way that emphasizes problems
common to minimum wage regulation and to employment dis-
crimination law. Shared problems suggest that solutions, if they
exist at all, might share conceptual foundations or at least draw
from the same repertoire. In other words, I suggest that, yes, the
minimum wage is civil rights legislation, and that seeing it as
such may help us understand the strongest case for its existence.
The labor/civil rights nexus aside, this effort is independent-
ly worthwhile because, in my view, legal theorizing about the
5 Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights at 7 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
6 Id at 85 (emphasis added). See also Paul Frymer, Black and Blue: African Ameri-
cans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party (Princeton 2008).
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minimum wage is tragically moribund. This neglect, in particu-
lar relative to employment discrimination law,7 is especially re-
markable given the minimum wage's continuing prominence in
national politics;8 its vibrant role in state and local economic jus-
tice campaigns; 9 and its upsurge in importance as a litigation
tool, especially in legal advocacy for immigrant workers.'0 De-
spite this, the most powerful recent scholarly accounts have been
relentlessly critical, integrating positive and normative analyses
of minimum wage regulation drawn from law and economics
with a particular emphasis on institutional design.
The thrust of arguments such as Daniel Shaviro's is that
even if the minimum wage attempts to address a real problem, it
does so in a way that is clearly inferior to feasible institutional
alternatives-some form of cash transfer funded out of general
tax revenues-and possibly counterproductive.1" Arguments like
Shaviro's have become hegemonic, in the sense that counterar-
guments largely remain within the same terms of debate while
seeking to eke out a victory nonetheless. 12 Arguments for the
minimum wage marshal evidence that more low-income workers
are helped than the critics charge; fewer jobs are lost; the alter-
natives have their problems, too; and so on.13
Spirited as this debate is, it is remarkably narrow. Both
sides basically agree that the minimum wage should be eva-
7 As just one very crude measure, a search of article titles in the LexisNexis "US
Law Reviews and Journals, Combined" library on Jan 23, 2009 produced 170 hits for
',..rnim wage" or 'living wage" or FLSA or F.L.S.A. or "fair labor standards"> and
1737 hits for <((work or employ!) & discriminat!) or -litle viTi--.
8 For instance, raising the minimum wage was at the top of Democrats' domestic
policy agenda in the 2006 Congressional election and succeeding 110th Congress. See Carl
Hulse, House, by a Wide Margin, Backs Minimum-Wage Rise, NY Times, 2007 WLNR
568900 (Jan 11, 2007).
9 Paul K. Sonn and Stephanie Luce, New Directions for the Living Wage Movement,
in Annette Bernhardt, et al, eds, The Gloves-Off Economy: Workplace Standards at the
Bottom of America's Labor Market 269 (Cornell 2008).
10 Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights (Harvard
2005); Benjamin Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 Cardozo L Rev 2685 (2008);
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
Colum L Rev 319 (2005).
11 Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Credit and Optimal Sub-
sidy Policy, 64 U Chi L Rev 405 (1997). See also David Neumark and William L. Wascher,
Minimum Wages (MIT 2008). But see David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Myth and Mea-
surement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage (Princeton 1995).
12 On the emergence, and limitations, of the current terms of debate, see Oren M.
Levin-Waldman, The Rhetorical Evolution of the Minimum Wage, 3 Rhetoric & Pub Aft
131 (2000).
13 Consider Economic Policy Institute, Minimum Wage Issue Guide (Aug 2008),
available at <http://www.epi.orgpage/-/old/issueguides/minwage/epi-minimum-wage-
issue guide.pdfl> (last visited Mar 24, 2009).
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luated as an antipoverty program; they disagree merely about
how the policy fares under that rubric. Supporters insist that "if
you work, then you shouldn't be poor," 14 and opponents counter
that minimum wage regulation can undermine that goal by caus-
ing job loss and that tax-and-transfer programs like the Earned
Income Tax Credit ("EITC") can more efficiently target low-
income workers. Notably, supporters largely have given up on
alternative arguments grounded in notions of employer exploita-
tion or superior bargaining power that once held more sway.' 5
In contrast, far greater normative pluralism reigns in em-
ployment discrimination law. The same basic analytic strategy
used against the minimum wage can be deployed there, too. Law
and economics scholars argue that (at least much of) antidiscri-
mination law disrupts the results of competitive labor markets
by forcing employers to take on additional costs for the benefit of
specific groups. Even if such redistributive goals are justified,
labor market regulation is an inferior way to advance them be-
cause the tax-and-transfer system can target the proper benefi-
ciaries of redistribution more efficiently and without perversely
discouraging employers from hiring the very people targeted for
benefits. When the imperial armies of law and economics have
marched on antidiscrimination law, however, many more scho-
lars and political actors resist. Something more seems to be at
stake: basic civil rights.
This intellectual terrain seems to reflect the divide between
"economic" issues and "civil rights" already sketched. The mini-
mum wage seems an economic issue appropriate to economic
analysis, but that analysis arguably misses the point when it
comes to the separate domain of civil rights. My suggestion is
that ongoing resistance to economic reductionism in the realm of
civil rights-as occurs in antidiscrimination law-is forging intel-
lectual tools of wider significance. 1 Perhaps the defense of anti-
14 See Jeff Chapman, If You Work, Then You Shouldn't Be Poor, Economic Snapshots
(Economic Policy Institute Mar 22, 2006), available at<http://www.epi.org/ economic
_snapshots/entry/webfeaturessnapshots_20060322/> (last visited Mar 24, 2009). For a
book length argument in this vein, see Jerold L. Waltman, The Case for the Living Wage
(Algora 2004).
15 On the history of competing theories of the minimum wage, see Seth D. Harris,
Conceptions of Fairness in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 Hofstra Lab & Emp L J 19
(2000).
16 Compare Robin D.G. Kelley, Identity Politics and Class Struggle, 6 New Pol 84, 88
(1997) (rejecting criticism that "identity politics" is intrinsically divisive and arguing that
"[tihe failure to conceive of these social movements as essential to the emancipation of the
whole remains the fundamental stumbling block to building a deep and lasting class-
based politics'); Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since
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discrimination law can teach us something about how to defend
the minimum wage.
Two basic intuitions underlie my hunch that something deep
connects those two bodies of law, something that cannot be re-
duced to antipoverty politics. First, for many of us, wage dispari-
ties can offend a commitment to human equality. And equality
seems as good a watchword for antidiscrimination law as any.
There remains, however, a crucial ambiguity as to whether the
offense lies in the low value placed on another's labor or in the
low purchasing power that results. When T.H. Marshall famous-
ly struggled with whether labor market inequality could be
squared with equal citizenship, unequal consumption was at the
forefront. 17 If, instead, the offense of low wages cannot be re-
duced to the offense of low income, then we have the beginning of
an argument why income redistribution should not displace wage
regulation.
Second, only an ostrich could fail to notice how often the
lowest paid workers hail from groups central to antidiscrimina-
tion projects, though exactly which group varies greatly-and
sometimes provokes bitter conflict during periods of transition-
with occupation, locale, and historical moment. Consider the ap-
palling labor conditions that have risen to prominence during the
reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. 8 And
yet simply conceiving of low-wage work as the sum of discrete
forms of discrimination seems to miss the way these labor condi-
tions may signal injustice by their very existence.
Intuitions can be wrong, of course, and so I do not mean to
suggest that there must be a way to defend the minimum wage.
Indeed, there are specific reasons to be suspicious. Locating eco-
nomic injustice in the wage bargain risks catering to a kind of
"everyday libertarianism"'19 that sanctifies the results of market
transactions while remaining hostile to overt wealth transfers.
Brown v. Board of Education (Chicago 2004) (building a general theory of citizenship in
part from African American political thought responsive to civil rights struggles). I have
tried to do something similar in my recent research extending feminist theories of non-
market work beyond the context of gendered household labor in which they initially de-
veloped. See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 Vand L Rev 857 (2008).
17 Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (cited in note 3).
18 Judith Browne-Dianis, et al, And Injustice for All: Workers' Lives in the Recon-
struction of New Orleans (Advancement Project 2007), available at <http://www.
advancementproject.org/reports/workersreport.pdf> (last visited Feb 3, 2009).
19 Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 31-
37 (Oxford 2002).
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Furthermore, it risks catering to the lingering appeal of a family
wage system that would structure the household economy
around a sole (presumptively male) wage-earner whose "depen-
dents" are economically unproductive and consigned to second-
class or derivative citizenship as a result. That ideal shaped so-
cial policy, including wage regulation, in the decades leading up
to passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 20 and it
resonates particularly strongly in arguments that one worker's
minimum wage should support a family. 21 Thus, the intuitions
should be conflicted, even for someone whose loyalties generally
lie to the left. But theories can be wrong, too, so what else can we
do but hope that digging for the roots of our dissatisfaction might
lead us to something new.
I proceed as follows. Part I briefly surveys existing justifica-
tions for the minimum wage and their established critiques. Part
II outlines an intellectual agenda for defending the minimum
wage. The key hurdles are characterizing the harm in terms of
wage rates rather than household income and justifying a reme-
dy that focuses on employer wage payments rather than compen-
satory cash transfers from the state. These challenges parallel
those that antidiscrimination law faces when it goes beyond a
principle of impartiality into terrain marked as "accommodation"
or "redistribution." Part III considers how an antidiscrimination
framework might address the first of these problems either
through "disparate impact" analysis of how subminimum wages
disproportionately affect groups traditionally protected by civil
rights or through broadening those groups to incorporate a con-
cept of discrimination based on economic class. I conclude that
these tend to reproduce rather than overcome the standard ob-
jections to the minimum wage, and so I turn in Part IV to a dif-
ferent approach. I extend my recent argument that preventing
"membership causation" (harm traceable to membership in a
protected class) provides a theoretical synthesis of "disparate
treatment" and "accommodation" theories in antidiscrimination
20 For a general discussion of the "family wage" and its role in social policy, see Alice
Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit Of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizen-
ship in 20th-Century America (Oxford 2001); Linda Gordon, Pitied but not Entitled: Single
Mothers and the History of Welfare 53 (Free Press 1994); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Sol-
diers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States 33-34
(Belknap 1992); Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal
Public Policy (Cornell 1998).
21 On disputes among feminists over the living wage concept, see Michille Barrett
and Mary McIntosh, The " Family Wage" Some Problems for Socialists and Feminists, 11
Capital & Class 51 (1980).
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law. The basic idea here is that sufficiently low wages indicate
that the worker's earnings have been suppressed by morally ar-
bitrary factors (including but not limited to race and sex), even if
those factors cannot be identified with precision in the individual
case. Requiring an employer to pay supra-market wages is like
making an employer provide an accommodation that allows an
employee to work as productively as if she had no (morally arbi-
trary) impairment. I conclude with some preliminary thoughts on
the second hurdle, making the employer responsible for redress-
ing low wages.
I. THE LIMITS OF EXISTING THEORIES OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
Currently there are two basic approaches to justifying the
minimum wage. The first begins with the substantive outcome
for the worker and objects to how poor the low wage leaves her.
The minimum wage then advances distributive justice by miti-
gating her poverty. Even accepting that distributive goals can
override standard libertarian and utilitarian defenses of free con-
tract, the antipoverty justification faces a seemingly insuperable
challenge on institutional design grounds: other mechanisms
could achieve the desired redistribution more precisely, more
completely, and with fewer adverse side effects.
The second approach casts contracts for subminimum wages
as procedurally defective. Instead of a valid agreement, the em-
ployer exploits the worker, essentially stealing some of her labor
without compensation. In the Marxist tradition, such exploita-
tion inheres in any wage contract. The reformist liberal version
is narrower, seeing only some contracts as afflicted by an "in-
equality of bargaining power" that leads to expropriation. In both
cases, powerful critiques suggest that these arguments are em-
pirically false, fundamentally misleading, or simply incoherent.
This Part reprises these basic justifications and critiques.
Inevitably, I will ride roughshod over subtle but potentially sig-
nificant distinctions, ignore other plausible and sometimes more
nuanced typologies without explaining why, and treat certain
battles as lost even when some combatants wish to fight on. My
purpose is not to provide a comprehensive review and evaluation
but simply to say enough to motivate searching for a new ap-
proach and to identify challenges that such an approach would
do well to overcome.
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A. Redistributing to the Working Poor
In many contexts, and especially in political and policy are-
nas, the most prominent arguments for the minimum wage are
straightforward appeals to distributive justice:22
1) Someone who works full-time shouldn't be left with so
little as $X.
2) Therefore, their wages should be high enough to leave
their earnings greater than $X.
For present purposes, I focus on the second proposition,
which offers an institutional implementation of the widely held
normative commitment that "if you work you shouldn't be poor."
Thus, I simply bracket objections to that normative principle.
Furthermore, I bracket arguments that the minimum wage con-
travenes other principles that compete with the first, such as
libertarian invocations of free contract and utilitarian objections
to blocking mutually beneficial exchanges. That said, I'll also
assume that if two policies are equally effective at vindicating
the "if you work you shouldn't be poor" principle, then these oth-
er considerations could break the tie.
There are two basic institutional design objections to the
minimum wage: targeting and perversity. The targeting objec-
tion concerns the closeness of fit between the group of people
wronged according to the "if you work you shouldn't be poor"
principle and the group of people whose wages are raised by in-
stituting a minimum wage. The perversity objection asserts that
imposing a minimum wage causes employers to cut jobs or work
hours, thereby reducing some workers' incomes contrary to the
normative goal. 23 My focus here is on the targeting objection be-
cause it is more closely tied to the antipoverty rationale.
The core insight of the targeting critique is that the mini-
mum wage "targets people with low hourly wages, rather than
22 David Neumark and William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Low-Wage Workers:
How Well Does Reality Match the Rhetoric?, 92 Minn L Rev 1296, 1302-03 (2008).
23 The basic argument is a straightforward microeconomic analysis: if you increase
the price employers must pay for certain individuals' work, employers will buy less of it.
The existence, magnitude, distribution, and form of this disemployment effect have been
hotly disputed within the economics literature since empirical studies by prominent econ-
omists David Card and Alan Krueger found no evidence of short-term job losses after a
modest wage increase. Card and Krueger, Myth and Measurement (cited in note 11). But
see Shaviro, 64 U Chi L Rev at 439-57 (cited in note 11); Neumark and Wascher, Mini-
mum Wages (cited in note 11).
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those who are poor. ' 24 Conventional conceptions of poverty
measure economic need (1) using total income, not only wage in-
come; (2) using fixed periods of time much longer than an hour;
(3) using a metric that varies with household size; and (4) using
income from all household members.
By collapsing "income" into "wages," the minimum wage
withholds distributive benefits from nonearners, even if they are
poor. This feature more or less implements the "if you work" pro-
viso. Therefore, I will set aside (for now) objections to what is, in
effect, a very stringent work requirement on poverty relief. Even
so, the minimum wage defines "work" extremely narrowly. By
tying the intervention to employment, it ignores low-income free-
lancers, independent contractors, and entrepreneurs. 25 That
would be no concern if the policy attacked a phenomenon specific
to the employer-employee relationship (such as inequality of bar-
gaining power), but treating it as a response to poverty disclaims
such an analysis.
Even lwhen wages are the only source of income, income is a
function not only of the wage rate but also of hours worked.
Translating the "if you work you shouldn't be poor" principle into
hourly wages requires specifying an amount of time devoted to
work during a week, year, or whatever period over which income
is measured. Part-year and part-time workers fit awkwardly into
this system. If such workers ought not to be poor even though
they don't work full-time, then the minimum wage will be too low
for them if it is calculated based on full-time work. But raising
the rate to relieve poverty for part-time workers will result in it
being higher than necessary for full-time workers. Similarly, a
rate set based on full-time work will be too high when applied to
those who work more than full-time. Avoiding these difficulties
would require varying the minimum wage by hours of work.
Just as a minimum wage does not vary with hours, 26 neither
does it vary with family size.27 And yet poverty is a function of
both income and household composition. In 2009, the U.S. pover-
24 Shaviro, 64 U Chi L Rev at 433 (cited in note 11).
25 For an overview of the scope of "employment" relationships in U.S. law, see Noah
D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in Annette Bernhardt,
et al, eds, The Gloves-Off Economy: Workplace Standards at the Bottom ofAmerica's La-
bor Market 31 (LERA 2008).
26 Overtime rules present an exception, but not one designed to address the problem
described in the text.
27 See Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-
Size Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 Tax L Rev 301, 309 (2004).
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ty line for a family of four was $22,050 per year and for a single
individual was $10,830.28 Someone who works forty hours a
week, fifty-two weeks a year, at $7.25 (the minimum wage as of
July 200929) will earn $15,080, smack in the middle. If poverty is
the benchmark, then the minimum wage is 50 percent too high
for someone who lives alone and 25 percent too low for someone
supporting a family of four. It will not do to quibble that the po-
verty thresholds themselves are too high or too low, that the
wage is too far from or too close to one threshold or the other, or
that one should assume a different number of hours per year.
Such adjustments can only bring wage income closer to one thre-
shold by pushing it further from the other. This problem is in-
evitable unless the minimum wage itself varied with household
size. But that solution would violate the widely held principle of
"equal pay for equal work" and, more generally, the notion that
the wage places a value on the work performed. 30
The household unit of poverty analysis poses a second prob-
lem, namely that poverty is a function of the income of all house-
hold members. As an antipoverty policy, however, the minimum
wage is premised on the idea that one worker's earnings support
the entire household. In this way, it reflects the reigning family
wage ideology of the early 20th century. Once one accepts house-
holds with multiple wage-earners, the linkage between any one
worker's wage and family income breaks down. If we assume
that each household includes two adult earners, then translating
the "if you work you shouldn't be poor" principle into wage policy
would counsel a minimum wage producing earnings equal only to
half the poverty line. Or, again, one could introduce inequality
into the minimum wage itself, making it higher for so-called
"primary" breadwinners, with all the attendant problems noted
previously with regard to wage variations by family size or work
schedule. 31 Instead, antipoverty arguments in favor of a mini-
mum wage generally ignore this tension between the antipoverty
28 Department of Health and Human Services, Notice of Annual Update of the HHS
Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed Reg 4199, 4200 (2009), available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov
/POVERTY/09poverty.shtml> (last visited Feb 6, 2009).
29 29 USC § 206(a)(1)(C) (2006).
30 But see Alice Kessler-Harris, A Woman's Wage: Historical Meanings and Social
Consequences (Kentucky 1990).
31 Sex discrimination in pay has often been based on the notion that men's wages
need to support a family whereas women's wages do not. For a general discussion, see id.
Since 1989, the FLSA has permitted a temporary sub-minimum wage for teenagers. Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub L No 101-157, 103 Stat 938 (1989), codified
at 29 USC § 206(g) (2006).
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goal and a minimum wage that does not vary with household
structure.
In theory, the minimum wage could remain a good policy
notwithstanding all these ways in which it can be over- and un-
der-inclusive relative to the "if you work you shouldn't be poor"
principle. For one thing, I have not attempted to assess the mag-
nitude of these deviations. What percentage of minimum wage
workers live in poor households? What percentage of minimum
wage workers are sole breadwinners? What percentage of mini-
mum wage workers have "dependents"? And so on.32
To my mind, though, disputes over these questions occupy
far too much of the debate over the minimum wage. They have a
"half empty vs. half full" quality, with critics emphasizing how
often the policy mistargets and supporters emphasizing how of-
ten it hits the mark. These questions would be vitally important
if we faced a choice between the minimum wage and doing noth-
ing. Even in that situation, we would need to know how to weigh
instances of targeting against those of mistargeting: over-
inclusiveness is problematic only if it generates some harm with-
out antipoverty benefit.
The real force of the targeting critique comes when it is
coupled with the argument that an alternative policy provides a
closer fit. If that alternative hits the target at least as often as
the minimum wage and misses the target less often, then it be-
comes difficult to understand how the minimum wage ever could
be the preferable policy. It is simply beside the point whether it
is better than nothing because that is not the choice at hand.
This focus on alternatives is what distinguishes the contempo-
rary institutional design critique from a simply rejectionist posi-
tion.
The leading alternative is the EITC.33 Of course, the EITC
already exists, so the question usually is posed as a trade-off be-
tween raising the minimum wage and expanding the EITC, but
in principle one could repeal the minimum wage and rely entire-
32 For data answering these and related questions, see Richard V. Burkhauser and
Joseph J. Sabia. The Effectiveness of Minimum-Wage Increases in Reducing Poverty: Past,
Present and Future, 25 Contemporary Econ Pol 262 (2007); Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Characteristics of Minimum
Wage Workers: 2007, available at <http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2OO7tbls.htm> (last
visited Mar 25, 2009); Amy Chasanov, No Longer Getting By: An Increase in the Mini-
mum Wage Is Long Overdue, (Economic Policy Institute 2004), available at <http://www.
epi.orglpublications/entrybriefingpapersbpl51/> (last visited Mar 25, 2009).
33 26 USC § 32 (2006). See Shaviro, 64 U Chi L Rev 405 (cited in note 11); Neumark
and Wascher, Minimum Wages (cited in note 11).
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ly on the EITC, or vice versa. The two programs might properly
coexist, but the case will be strongest if they serve distinct func-
tions, rather than being two approaches to implementing the "if
you work you shouldn't be poor" principle. More generally, the
EITC stands in for a broader class of tax-and-transfer mechan-
isms for delivering cash to low-income workers, whether through
a redesigned EITC, 34 other programs administered through the
tax system, or through spending programs located in other agen-
cies and financed from general revenues.35
The EITC fits very well with the "if you work you shouldn't
be poor" principle. It provides additional cash to low-income
households that have earnings from either employment or self-
employment, keeping the minimum wage's tight connection be-
tween "work" and earning but also broadening it beyond wages
alone. 36 Someone without earnings gets nothing, and the benefits
increase steadily with increasing work hours, up until the point
one earns in the vicinity of $10 thousand to $15 thousand. This
maximum benefit range roughly corresponds to full-time, full-
year work at the minimum wage. Consequently, for a low-wage
worker, the EITC varies with work hours roughly as the mini-
mum wage does: part-time or part-year workers get less than
would be necessary to lift them to the poverty threshold, but they
are not disqualified for insufficient work.37 When hours above
full-time lead to higher income, however, the value of the EITC
declines.
Unlike the minimum wage, the EITC conditions its benefits
on low household income, not merely low individual earnings.
Someone with substantial unearned income receives a lower
benefit, or none at all. Additionally, the EITC aggregates house-
hold members' incomes. Therefore, for a household with two
adults working full-time, full-year at roughly the minimum
wage, the EITC will be well into its "phase-out" range, delivering
far less than if the household contained only one such worker.
31 See Zelenak, 57 Tax L Rev 301 (cited in note 27).
35 See Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsi-
dies, 108 Yale L J 967 (1999) (comparing various forms of employment subsidy); Edmund
S. Phelps, Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and Self-Support to Free Enter-
prise 103-21 (Harvard 1997) (proposing a wage subsidy delivered through tax credits to
employers).
36 Noah D. Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 Hastings L J 1131, 1137 (2006).
37 For higher-wage workers, however, the EITC will grant full benefits for part-year
or part-time work because it measures only earnings, not hours. Lawrence M. Mead,
Rebuilding Welfare into a Work-Based System, Poverty Research News 8, 9 (2001) (criti-
cizing this aspect of the EITC).
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The difference is explained by the fact that the household is less
poor, if it is poor at all, because of the higher aggregate income.
The minimum wage, in contrast, delivers much higher benefits to
the household with more workers because they work more hours
at enhanced wages.
The EITC also varies in size depending on household compo-
sition. A modest benefit is available to those without children,
but substantial increases are available for the first and second
child, though not thereafter. This approach only roughly tracks
conventional poverty measures because there are no adjustments
for the number of adults or for three or more children. Nonethe-
less, it is much more responsive to varying household needs than
is the minimum wage. More generally, and unlike the minimum
wage, the EITC's basic administrative apparatus easily could be
modified to incorporate other family size variations and to alter
the benefit increments associated with different household confi-
gurations.
Surprisingly, the targeting argument for favoring the EITC
(as is or suitably redesigned) over the minimum wage critique
has received little sustained rebuttal that seriously engages the
force of its arguments. Nonetheless, three basic types of response
come to mind and can be found to some degree in the popular
debate and shorter academic treatments. The first approach
simply minimizes the extent of the minimum wage's mistarget-
ing relative to the EITC's. 38 For instance, in a paper that en-
dorses expansions of both the minimum wage and the EITC, Isa-
bel Sawhill and Adam Thomas acknowledge the targeting criti-
que and find that only a quarter of minimum wage workers were
poor in 1998.39 They note, however, that a much higher propor-
tion-55 percent--of minimum wage workers lived in households
with incomes below 200 percent of the poverty line, which consti-
tute roughly the bottom third of the income distribution. Moreo-
38 A related set of criticisms compares the EITC to other actual or potential tax-and-
transfer programs, for instance noting that the EITC's use of the year as the unit of anal-
ysis and transfer delivery may be too unresponsive to shorter-term experiences of poverty
and their immediate consequences. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit
and Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 Harv L Rev 533, 579-84 (1995); David
A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale
L J 955, 1022-23 (2004). Because traditional means-tested transfer programs do not
share this problem, it has less force in a general comparison between the minimum wage
and transfer payments.
39 Isabel Sawhill and Adam Thomas, A Hand Up for the Bottom Third: Toward a
New Agenda for Low-Income Working Families 17 (Brookings Institution 2001), available
at <http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/200/05useconomics-sawhill/20010
522.pdf> (last visited Mar 25, 2009).
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ver, they present data showing that 61 percent of workers in poor
families had wages at or below their proposed minimum wage of
$6.15 (a $1 raise from the rate at the time). While these data
imply that the minimum wage is accurately targeted more often
than not and that most of those targeted benefit from the mini-
mum wage, Sawhill and Thomas provide no argument that the
minimum wage is superior to the EITC in either regard. Indeed,
they later show that 90 percent of the value of the EITC goes to
households with incomes under 200 percent of the poverty line. 40
We are simply left to wonder what the affirmative argument is
for utilizing the minimum wage at all.
The second type of response to the targeting critique invokes
political feasibility. The core political advantage of the minimum
wage is that, as a matter of overt form, it does not involve the
government taxing some people in order to give money to others.
In other words, it does not overtly engage in redistribution. It
trades libertarian resistance to regulation against libertarian
resistance to taxation. From the perspective of public budgets,
the minimum wage is free. 41
This political advantage can be viewed two different ways.
If, in fact, the purpose of the minimum wage is to redistribute to
poor workers, then its political advantage derives from its sup-
porters' ability to trick people. Regardless of whether the policy
orders employers to pay their workers more or orders taxpayers
to pay the government more so that it can give the money to
workers, state power is being used to redistribute.42 Ironically,
EITC supporters play much the same game, taking pains to dis-
tinguish the EITC from a transfer payment, instead styling it as
merely a tax refund. Both camps fall over themselves to distin-
guish their favored policy from that horror "welfare," and indeed
to argue that some of the policy's affirmative value comes in sav-
ing deserving hard-working folks from the shame of needing gov-
ernment assistance to avoid poverty. Such smoke screens may be
necessary in the rough and tumble of politics, 43 and I do not
40 Id at 22.
41 See Barry Bluestone and Teresa Ghilarducci, Making Work Pay: Wage Insurance
for the Working Poor, Levy Economics Institute Public Policy Brief No 28 16-17 (Bard
1996), available at <http://www.levy.org/pubs/ppb28.pdf> (last visited Feb 6, 2009) (ar-
guing that the minimum wage's "first and foremost" virtue is that "it increases workers'
earnings without placing a burden on the taxpayer").
42 Consider Shaviro, 64 U Chi L Rev 405 (cited in note 11).
43 See Waltman, The Case for the Living Wage at 90, 106 (cited in note 14) (arguing
for the political virtues of the lack of transparency in the distribution of the minimum
wage's costs and benefits).
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purport to pass judgment on those employing these strategies so
long as they are understood for what they are.44
Another possibility, however, is that the political virtues of
the minimum wage stem not simply from political elites' ability
to manipulate the masses but instead from its appeal to widely
held normative goals that do not fit easily into the antipoverty
framework. On that view, the mismatch between political appeal
and policy analysis suggests lack of intellectual clarity and crea-
tivity among those framing the minimum wage in antipoverty
terms, not gullibility in the public.
The third type of rebuttal to the institutional design argu-
ment against the minimum wage suggests that shifting costs
from the government to employers is not a trick at all. Instead, it
is the proper goal. In contrast, policies like the EITC subsidize
employers, letting them off the hook of paying their workers
higher wages. 45 This occurs in two ways. First, given some base-
line wage level, increasing a worker's income through the EITC
rather than raising the minimum wage allows the employer to
continue paying wages that are "too low," and shifts the costs of
correcting the problem to innocent third parties, the taxpayers at
large. Second, given some baseline wage level, adding an EITC
will actually lead employers to lower wages. Workers do not cap-
ture the entire wage subsidy but rather split it with employers,
just as payroll taxes nominally levied against employers are
passed along to workers to some degree.46 This phenomenon has
been referred to as the "Speenhamland effect" after a notoriously
disastrous wage insurance policy instituted in Great Britain in
the early nineteenth century.47
44 Of course, if everyone understood them this way, they would no longer be as effec-
tive.
45 See Bluestone and Ghilarducci, Making Work Pay at 23-24 (cited in note 41); J.W.
Mason, The Flattering Tax: Does the Country's Leading Anti-Poverty Program-the
Earned Income Tax Credit-Actually Help Keep Wages Low?, City Limits (June 2002),
available at <http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/viewarticle.cfm?article-id=2768>
(last visited Mar 25, 2009).
46 See Alstott, 108 Yale L J at 1019-22 (cited in note 35); Nada Eissa and Austin
Nichols, Tax-Transfer Policy and Labor-Market Outcomes, 95 Am Econ Rev 88, 90-92
(2005).
47 Bluestone and Ghilarducci, Making Work Pay (cited in note 41). See also Karl
Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 98-
124 (Beacon 2001). To put an even finer point on it, some workers who would receive a
raise from the minimum wage may actually find their income lowered by the EITC-low-
wage workers who qualify for little or no EITC (because they have no children or have a
significantly higher earning spouse, for example), but who work in occupations with many
EITC recipients. See Jesse Rothstein, The Unintended Consequences of Encouraging
Work: Tax Incidence and the EITC, Princeton University Center for Economic Policy
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The crucial point about this "subsidy" argument is that it re-
lies upon abandoning an antipoverty rationale. It values not
simply how much money ends up in the worker's pocket but in-
stead, or also, how much she gets paid by her employer. It also
takes as its baseline the wage levels that exist in a labor market
without an EITC.
The subsidy rebuttal thus offers the most robust challenge to
the targeting critique because it implies a fundamentally differ-
ent set of criteria with which to evaluate the relative merits of
the minimum wage. Making good on that challenge, however,
requires articulating and defending a justification for the mini-
mum wage that eschews reliance on its antipoverty effects.
Before beginning to consider such justifications, I note that
focusing on wage payments (as opposed to total income) may
heighten the importance of the perversity critique, which I have
set aside for now. Perversity's engine is the attempt to make em-
ployers foot the bill for getting more money to their own low-
wage workers. EITC-like transfers funded from general revenues
remove employers' incentive to substitute away from low-wage
employment.48 They do so by breaking the link between the min-
imum wage's funding source (low-wage employers) and its bene-
ficiaries (low-wage workers), That, of course, is precisely what
galls those who accuse the EITC of "subsidizing" employers'
wrongfully low wages.
B. Correcting Defects in the Wage Bargain
The second major approach to justifying the minimum wage
is to offer it as a corrective to defects in the wage bargain be-
tween employer and employee. In its most stylized form, the min-
imum wage remedies employer theft. If an employer refuses to
pay a worker the agreed-upon wage for work performed, the em-
ployer is a thief. The same is true if the employer forces the
worker at gunpoint to agree to work for no wage at all or tricks
her into the same. Furthermore, it can make no fundamental
difference if what the employer steals is not the entire wage but
only some fraction of it.
To be sure, wage theft is a recurring problem.49 Outright re-
fusals to pay are not uncommon in the informal economy, espe-
Studies Working Paper No 165 (May 2008), available at <http://www.princeton.edu
/-ceps/workingpapers165rothstein.pdf> (last visited May 9, 2009).
48 Shaviro, 64 U Chi L Rev at 455 (cited in note 11).
'9 Kimberly A. Bobo, Wage Theft in America (New Press 2009).
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cially in short-term relationships like day labor or in the final
days of an undercapitalized firm's demise. And large, sophisti-
cated firms accomplish something similar by falsifying time
records. 50 Furthermore, employers sometimes resort to physical
coercion (imprisonment, violence, or threats thereof) or legal
coercion (for instance, manipulating immigrants' vulnerability to
deportation by controlling access to their passports). In such cir-
cumstances, the FLSA provides a short-cut to legal success, up to
the amount of the minimum wage. The worker need not prove
the exact wage agreed upon nor the force or trickery used to
cheat her out of it. Nonpayment alone establishes a violation and
entitlement to a remedy.
Wage theft of these sorts, however, is marginal to the core
issues at stake in the minimum wage debate. In principle, it can
be addressed through general laws regulating theft, duress, and
fraud. The real meat of the minimum wage is its application
when employers pay the agreed-upon wage in full and the wage
agreement was not tainted by any employer-specific misconduct.
In other words, what matters most about the minimum wage is
that it is no defense to show that the employer simply paid the
going rate in a competitive market.
Can an employer's payment of market wages nonetheless be
analogized to theft, even absent broken promises, force, or fraud?
The radical answer is "yes, always." One strand of Marxist
thought sees theft as intrinsic to any wage bargain because the
employer necessarily appropriates "surplus value." A labor
theory of value attributes to labor all value created in the pro-
duction process, and so employers' profits (that is, returns above
the cost of capital inputs) necessarily involve retaining for them-
selves wealth created by their workers and to which the workers
have rightful claims.5 1 On this view, wage labor necessarily in-
volves an unequal exchange in which the employer exploits the
worker.
A minimum wage would be rather weak medicine for an
affliction this severe, but that problem aside, theories of exploita-
tion based on the labor theory of value largely have been aban-
50 See, for example, Steven Greenhouse, The Big Squeeze: Tough Times for the Amer-
ican Worker 53-55 (Knopf 2008).
51 See John E. Roemer, Property Relations vs. Surplus Value in Marxian Exploitation,
in John E. Roemer, ed, Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosophical Economics 37
(Cambridge 1994); Gerald A. Cohen, The Labour Theory of Value and the Concept of Ex-
ploitation, in Gerald A. Cohen, ed, History, Labour, and Freedom: Themes from Marx 209,
210 (Clarendon 1988).
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doned, even by leftist economists and philosophers bent on pre-
serving Marxism's core insights.52 I won't belabor the point here,
but one basic problem is that the labor theory of value appears
simply to be false. A single worker's productivity rises or falls in
part with the quality of the tools and supplies with which she
works, and not just because of differences in prior labor inputs
into those tools and supplies.53
"Inequality of bargaining power" provides the moderate al-
ternative to the labor theory of value. Indeed, it is a ubiquitous
slogan throughout and a ready justification for labor and em-
ployment law.54 Unfortunately, there are serious reasons to
doubt that it has any substantial intellectual content. As Duncan
Kennedy argued long ago, "unequal bargaining power" typically
functions as a placeholder for the conflict between two commit-
ments: inchoate disgust with the outcomes of market processes
under conditions of systematic inequality and fundamental sup-
port for liberal institutions. 55 Thus, we believe that market bar-
gains are the appropriate way to order economic life, but in the
case before us the outcome is appalling. Therefore we conclude
that the bargaining process must have been defective: the victi-
mized party had unequal bargaining power.
The concept of unequal bargaining power promises to pre-
serve the substance/procedure distinction and identify wrongful
bargains without regard to their substantive outcomes. With a
partial exception to which I will return later, attempts to make
good on this promise have failed. As scholars of various political
and intellectual stripes have argued, the conventional criteria for
identifying unequal bargaining power go nowhere, or at least not
very far: take-it-or-leave-it terms, "big" employers versus "little"
workers, workers' "brutal need" for an income. 56 At least in rela-
tively competitive labor markets, none of these hold much sway.
52 See John E. Roemer, Should Marxists Be Interested in Exploitation?, 14 Phil & Pub
Aff 30 (1985); Roemer, Property Relations (cited in note 51); Cohen, Labour Theory (cited
in note 51).
53 See Cohen, Labour Theory at 233 (cited in note 51); Philippe Van Parijs, Real
Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? 151-53 (Clarendon 1995).
54 See Guy Davidov, The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law, 146 Intl Lab Rev 311, 312-
13 (2007); Mark Barenberg, Workers, in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet, eds, The Oxford
Handbook of Legal Studies ch 26 at 566-67 (Oxford 2003); Ian Ayres and Stewart
Schwab, The Employment Contract, 8 Kan J L & Pub Pol 71, 74 (1999).
55 Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md L
Rev 563 (1982).
56 See id at 615-20; Ayres and Schwab, 8 Kan J L & Pub Pol at 74-79 (cited in note
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Moreover, there is little reason to think that deviations from this
assumption-such as a degree of employer monopsony-are dis-
proportionately important at the bottom end of the wage scale or
that minimum wage laws can correct for them effectively.57
Furthermore, wage terms are especially poor candidates for
reconstructing "unequal bargaining power" in terms of market
failure. They are not public goods in the ways that union solidar-
ity and workplace safety arguably are;5 8 they do not concern pro-
tections against low probability events or acts of employer bad
faith, as workplace safety and protections against unjust dismis-
sal arguably do;5 9 they do not concern what otherwise would be
"gaps" in the employment contract or conflicts between what em-
ployees expect and what the written or default terms actually
provide; 60 and they do not concern topics on which workers have
particularly poor information.61 Instead, wages are probably the
simplest, most prominent, easiest understood aspect of employ-
ment. Thus, even if one is inclined toward neoclassical or beha-
vioral economic justifications for constraints on the substance of
employment contracts, 62 the minimum wage provides the weak-
est case-and therefore an ideal one in which to try to develop
alternatives to that entire family of analysis.
What then is left of "inequality of bargaining power"? Many
scholars think nothing at all.63 One final possibility, though,
builds on the notion that low-wage workers have nowhere else to
turn, and therefore are at a disadvantage because they cannot
simply refuse to work. The problem here is disadvantage com-
pared to what? Not compared to an idealized bargaining process,
but instead compared to an alternate state of affairs in which the
parties enter the market with different resources: the worker has
the option of living off savings, or a trust fund, or family mem-
bers instead. Now, however, we have begun to travel away from
a procedural theory and back toward a substantive account of
just distribution. Because ideas along these lines have been ex-
57 Shaviro, 64 U Chi L Rev at 451-53 (cited in note 11).
58 Samuel Estreicher and Gillian Lester, Employment Law 211 (Foundation 2008);
Keith Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw U L Rev 471 (1992).
59 See Estreicher and Lester, Employment Law at 9, 54, 211 (cited in note 58).
60 See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights and Why
Does it Matter?, 77 NYU L Rev 6 (2002).
61 See Estreicher and Lester, Employment Law at 8, 210 (cited in note 58).
62 For skepticism that these are so many just-so stories, see Kennedy, 41 Md L Rev at
563 (cited in note 55).
63 See id at 615-20; Ayres and Schwab, 8 Kan J L & Pub Pol at 74-79 (cited in note
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plored rigorously in the Marxian tradition, I briefly review those
developments.
The demise of the labor theory of value does not exhaust the
possibilities for a theory of labor exploitation. Most notably, John
Roemer has developed such a theory as part of the broader intel-
lectual movement known as "analytical Marxism." 64 According to
Roemer, "Marxian exploitation" occurs whenever "the amount of
labor embodied in the goods which the worker can purchase with
his income (which usually consists only of wage income) is less
than the amount of labor he expended to earn that income."65
Exploitation of this sort is likely to occur when there is inequali-
ty in the ownership of productive assets.6 6 In a stylized two-
person model, if one person owns the factory, another owns noth-
ing, and both are equally capable of working, then the ratio of
income to productive work will plainly be higher for the factory
owner than for the proletarian.
If exploitation of this sort were considered intrinsically
wrongful, a minimum wage might be thought to be a partial re-
medy. It would increase the returns to labor of at least some
workers. Note, however, that low absolute wages would not nec-
essarily correspond to high levels of exploitation. That would de-
pend on the extent to which wage dispersion is caused by differ-
ences in ownership of productive assets, rather than by differ-
ences in workers' productivity.
Roemer argues, however, that exploitation ultimately is
normatively uninteresting, perhaps even misleading. What can
make exploitation morally objectionable is the underlying in-
equality in productive assets that yields it. That is the relevant
sense in which there is "unequal bargaining power" between
workers and employers. If, however, one considers that inequali-
ty to have arisen justly (for instance because one party scrimped
and saved while the other squandered), it is not so clear what is
objectionable about exploitation without resorting to a labor
theory of value. Inversely, under plausible assumptions, unequal
distributions of productive assets sometimes may not yield ex-
ploitation, or even yield exploitation of the more-propertied by
64 See John E. Roemer, ed, Analytical Marxism: Studies in Marxism and Social
Theory (Cambridge 1986).
65 Roemer, 14 Phil & Pub Aff at 30 (cited in note 52).
66 This observation connects Roemer's analysis to traditional Marxian concern with
control of the "means of production." See also Cohen, Labour Theory at 234 (cited in note
51).
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the less-propertied, and thus a focus on exploitation may blind us
to injustice in those distributions. 67
Thus, Roemer concludes that a focus on exploitation yields a
"fetishism of labor" 68 and that, instead, leftist political theory
ought to focus on deciding "[p]recisely when the asset distribu-
tion is unjust."6 9 "Unequal bargaining power" of the sort that re-
quires correction is simply a label applied to the labor market
consequences of an unjust distribution of wealth. Ironically, this
approach leads to intellectual convergence with liberal egalita-
rianism. 70
Roemer's analysis of exploitation thus mirrors, at a higher
level of abstraction, the tax policy critique of the minimum wage.
Receiving minimum wages is an imperfect, but not useless, proxy
for a worker's unjust disadvantage, and paying minimum wages
is an imperfect, but not useless, proxy for an employer's unjust
advantage. The wage itself, however, is uninteresting. To the
extent it is possible to attack directly unjust inequalities in the
distribution of productive assets, that would be preferable to re-
gulating the employee-employer relationship. And indeed, Roe-
mer's major institutional proposal is a system of "equal shares"
in ownership of productive capital.71 Broadly similar in their as-
piration are proposals from Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott
for "citizens' stakes ' 72 and from Philippe Van Parijs and others
for a "universal basic income."73 In all these cases, programs of
egalitarian wealth or income distribution are central, labor mar-
ket outcomes are epiphenomenal, and redistribution might even
enable labor market deregulation. 74 In other words, there may be
67 The assumptions involve more-propertied individuals with preferences for relative-
ly high consumption and low leisure. Roemer, 14 Phil & Pub Aff at 58-59 (cited in note
52).
68 Id at 64.
69 Id at 65. See also Cohen, Labour Theory at 238 (cited in note 51) (concluding that
"[i]nstead of desperately shifting about for some or other way of defending the labour
theory, Marxists and quasi-Marxists should address themselves to the crucial question,
which is whether or not private ownership of capital is morally legitimate").
70 Paul Warren, Should Marxists Be Liberal Egalitarians?, 5 J Pol Phil 47, 55 (1997).
71 John E. Roemer, A Future for Socialism, in John E. Roemer, Equal Shares: Making
Market Socialism Work 7 (Verso 1996).
72 Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (Yale 1999) (advocat-
ing a one-time grant of $80 thousand to each citizen upon reaching early adulthood).
73 Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (cited in note 53). On the potential for such poli-
cies to empower workers vis-A-vis employers, see Erik Olin Wright, Basic Income, Stake-
holder Grants, and Class Analysis, 32 Pol & Socy 79 (2004).
74 Alstott, 108 Yale L J at 1008-09 (cited in note 35).
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room to debate the merits of the EITC relative to other forms of
redistribution, but the minimum wage would miss the point.
II. A CONVERGENT MINIMUM WAGE AND
ANTIDISCRIMINATION AGENDA
The preceding Part followed arguments for the minimum
wage around in a circle. We began with an antipoverty theory,
saw that the minimum wage functioned poorly relative to alter-
native approaches to raising household income, and then fas-
tened on the possibility that the antipoverty framework missed a
distinct problem of unfairness in the wage relation. Turning to
theories of employer exploitation and superior bargaining power,
however, we saw that these carried little force, except insofar as
they could be reconstructed as the knock-on effects of a wrongful-
ly unequal distribution of wealth. And so we come back to the
minimum wage as a redistributive device and risk going round
all over again.
This Part identifies two points at which this circle might be
broken. I do not claim to establish that this can be done, but I do
hope to show that it would be worthwhile to try. As a source of
inspiration, I turn to employment discrimination law and ob-
serve that it faces similar challenges. Perhaps we can draw on
some of the moral intuitions, as well as the more elaborated
theories, developed in the antidiscrimination area and make
them fruitful elsewhere.
A. Between Poverty and Exploitation: The Injustice of
Low Wages
As an antipoverty policy, the minimum wage faces a basic
mismatch between means and ends. It regulates wages, not in-
come, and it does so with regard to individuals, not families. The
institutional design critique attacks this mismatch. A robust
theory of the minimum wage should explain why low wages are,
or can be, wrongful for reasons independent of the resulting low
income. But it should do so without relying on concepts of exploi-
tation or unequal bargaining power, unless these can be recon-
structed in new ways.
Employment discrimination law faces a similar challenge.
Like instances of wage theft discussed above, a set of cases is
uncontroversial. These involve employers who, all else being
equal, treat some employees worse because of their race, sex,
disability, etc. Moreover, the reason the employer engages in
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such "disparate treatment" is that they wish to harm members of
these groups, disrespect their abilities, or seek to interact with
them only as subordinates or outsiders. As with the application
of minimum wage laws to instances of wage theft, application of
employment discrimination law to these cases can be justified as
simply a context-specific manifestation of general principles of
intentional tort.75 Discrimination of this sort runs afoul of a prin-
ciple of impartiality that treats as illegitimate an employer's de-
sire to structure the workplace in ways differentiated by pro-
tected group membership. Instead, they should focus on making
money.76
The wrongfulness of such conduct is not a function of the
economic condition in which it leaves the worker or her house-
hold. This point is reflected in the fact that antidiscrimination
law applies without regard to workers' wage levels, incomes, and
household structures. The point is not to redistribute income to
the poor but to protect workers' civil rights to be treated as
equals. Employers who act with animus or contempt treat work-
ers wrongfully.77 The law prohibits them from doing so and,
when employers act otherwise, the law demands a remedy in the
spirit of corrective justice. The worker's economic situation is
beside the point. So, too, with cases of wage theft.
As with the minimum wage, the difficulty arises when em-
ployment discrimination law ventures outside this uncontrover-
sial area of corrective justice focused on employer wrongdoing
vis-A-vis its employees. Crucially, antidiscrimination law does so
with a vengeance. 78 In myriad ways, it forbids employers from
adhering to practices of market rationality designed to maximize
profits. Requirements that employers provide reasonable ac-
commodations to individuals with disabilities provide the most
obvious example. Employers must avoid practices that result in
individuals with disabilities suffering workplace disadvantage
because of their disability, so long as there are reasonable alter-
natives that prevent such disadvantage. Even if the design and
application of these practices relied entirely on ordinarily inno-
75 On the connections between certain forms of discrimination and intentional torts,
see Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 Stan L Rev 833, 853-55, 892-
93 (2001).
76 See, for example, id.
77 Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?: Biases, Prefe-
rences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U Pa L Rev 149 (1993).
78 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 Harv L Rev 642
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 Cal L Rev 751 (1991).
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cuous business reasons, the employer cannot refuse such alterna-
tives merely because they impose some cost, so long as they do
not rise to an undue hardship.
Importantly, this deviation from the paradigm of intentional
tort is not at all limited to the doctrinal category of "reasonable
accommodation." It arises even within the category of "intention-
al discrimination" forbidden by all employment discrimination
statutes and constitutional principles of equal protection. Em-
ployers cannot use employees' class membership as a decision-
making criterion even when doing so involves accurate "statistic-
al discrimination" that allows an employer to identify workers
who will be more productive or less costly to employ, or who will
live longer, or with whom customers or co-workers would prefer
not to deal. In addition, the "disparate impact" theory bars em-
ployers from practices that disproportionately harm one group or
another, even if they do so for ordinarily permissible reasons and
even if avoiding doing so would be somewhat disadvantageous in
ordinary business terms of cost or productivity.
Relying on such examples, scholars sometimes refer to all
antidiscrimination prohibitions on cost-justified employer con-
duct as "accommodation" mandates or bans on "rational" discrim-
ination. Application of antidiscrimination law to these forms of
"rational" discrimination is analogous to application of the mini-
mum wage beyond the easy case of wage theft. Such accommoda-
tion mandates have been analyzed, and often criticized, as forms
of "redistribution" to protected groups insofar as they modify the
outcomes of market bargains, and do so without identifying
wrongful employer acts that demand a response sounding in cor-
rective justice. 79
If antidiscrimination law had to rely on an antipoverty ra-
tionale, all these forms of "accommodation" would face targeting
challenges similar to the minimum wage. If the problem of
"rational" discrimination were limited to its consignment of indi-
viduals (or of a group disproportionately) to poverty (or perhaps
unemployment), there would be no reason to prohibit such dis-
crimination when it occurs well above the margin of poverty. But
79 Kelman, 53 Stan L Rev 833 (cited in note 75); Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nel-
son, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommo-
date the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 NC L Rev 307, 357 (2001); Jolls, 115 Harv L
Rev 642 (cited in note 78); Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against
Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard 1992); Samuel R. Bagenstos, 'Rational Dis-
crimination,"Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va L Rev
825 (2003).
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high-paid professionals, and workers with high-paid spouses,
enjoy the full protection of our antidiscrimination laws, even if
the discrimination in question only concerns the difference be-
tween being solidly middle class or better off than that. This fea-
ture of the Americans with Disabilities Act's ("ADA")80 reasona-
ble accommodation mandate has received criticism along the
lines suggested above. Amy Wax argues that "[s]ome workers,
even assuming their disability compromises their productivity,
might still earn enough even on a deregulated wage market to
cover basic needs. The reciprocity paradigm-which protects the
deserving poor-does not demand that these individuals be
brought up to the level of compensation received by everyone in
the same job category."81 More generally, Mark Kelman and oth-
ers criticize the ban on "rational" discrimination for allowing
members of protected groups to "jump the queue"8 2 in front of
others whose economic circumstances provide at least as strong a
claim to receive redistributive transfers.8 3
Justifying these "accommodation" mandates, and their ap-
parent redistribution along lines other than relative economic
disadvantage, arguably is the central task of antidiscrimination
theory. There are a number of strategies for doing so. Some at-
tempt to convert certain cases of rational discrimination back
into problems of corrective justice involving wrongful motiva-
tions.8 4 These are analogous to theories of exploitation and un-
equal bargaining power in the minimum wage context, which
portray the minimum wage as correcting a deviation (like force
or fraud) from idealized market behavior rather than as disrupt-
ing (through redistribution) the results of well-functioning mar-
kets.
More interesting for my purposes are approaches that simp-
ly eschew the corrective justice paradigm. The most common of
80 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
81 Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and "Real Efficiency A Unified Approach, 44
Wm & Mary L Rev 1421, 1449 (2003).
82 Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester, Jumping the Queue: An Inquiry into the Legal
Treatment of Students with Learning Disabilities (Harvard 1997).
83 Kelman, 53 Stan L Rev 833 (cited in note 75); Wax, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 1421
(cited in note 81). Similar issues arise when race-based affirmative action is accused of
mistargeting to the extent that it enhances (relative to the status quo) the prospects of
some middle-class members of minority groups while not doing so for economically disad-
vantaged whites.
84 For a general discussion, see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and
Social Equality (Yale 1996); Alexander, 141 U Pa L Rev 149 (cited in note 77); Michael
Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimi-
nation, 153 U Pa L Rev 579 (2004).
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these shift the unit of analysis to large social groups and see "ra-
tional" discrimination as perpetuating or producing their subor-
dination.8 5 Another, which I have been developing, sees "ration-
al" discrimination as unfair to the worker because-entirely
apart from the employer's motivations-she suffers harm for the
morally arbitrary reason that she belongs to a protected group.86
Both of these offer a conception of "civil rights" more expansive
than a right to a baseline of market contracting and distinct from
economic deprivation on an absolute scale. In this way, robust
conceptions of civil rights have crucial structural features that a
theory of the minimum wage needs to explain why low wages are
unjust, without either accusing the employer of theft or coercion
or invoking an antipoverty rationale.
B. Remedying Low Wages with Higher Wages: The
Employer's Role
Identifying low wages as an injustice does not necessarily
imply specifying higher wages as the remedy. The low wages
might not be the employer's fault, and so it might be unfair to
burden the employer with the remedy. Perhaps a compensatory
transfer from the state would do. Moreover, shifting costs to the
state avoids the risk that employers' attempts to evade these
costs will have perverse consequences.
Note that there actually are two distinct issues here: first,
whether the employer should deliver the remedy; and second,
whether the employer should pay for the remedy. The minimum
wage places on the employer the responsibility for both. In prin-
ciple, these could be separated. For instance, the government
might pay a wage subsidy to the employer, such that the employ-
er delivers a higher wage without paying for it.87 Or, the employ-
er might pay a payroll tax to the state, which would then pay the
proceeds to the worker.88
Again, employment discrimination raises analogous issues
about the proper allocation of costs to employers or the state. Ac-
commodation mandates face criticism for forcing employers to
85 See Bagenstos, 89 Va L Rev at 837 (cited in note 79); Sunstein, 79 Cal L Rev 751
(cited in note 78); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Georgetown L J 1619 (1991).
86 Zatz, Managing the Macaw (cited in note 1).
87 See Phelps, Rewarding Work (cited at note 35).
88 Shaviro argues that the minimum wage is functionally equivalent to a tax on em-
ployers delivered to their employees. Shaviro, 64 U Chi L Rev at 407 (cited in note 11).
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take on the costs of remedying injustices that, while real, are not
their responsibility.8 9 Doing so may lead employers to reduce
employment (or wages) of groups who tend to trigger these
costs.90 For instance, many argue that employers will limit their
hiring of people with disabilities to avoid the costs of accommo-
dating them.
There are two basic alternatives to mandating that employ-
ers pay for accommodations. First, employees might receive
assistance directly from the government without employer
involvement. .For instance, instead of holding employers respon-
sible for the racial disparate impact caused by restricting
employment of people with criminal records, the government
might provide targeted training to enhance their job skills or
subsidize certification procedures that would provide assurances
of their trustworthiness.9 1 Second, the government might offset
the employer's costs of avoiding discrimination. For instance, in
the ex-offender scenario, the government might provide tax cred-
its for hiring ex-offenders 92 or subsidize insurance against
workplace theft or violence. 93
Such proposals trigger resistance mainly for two reasons.
One is that they let the employer off the hook. This closely mir-
rors the Speenhamland objection to the EITC. 94 Consider, for
instance, the possibility that even the prohibition on "irrational"
disparate treatment is, on net, costly to employers, because the
benefits to the firm of preventing all such discrimination are
outweighed by the costs of preventing it (monitoring managers'
decisionmaking) or because even invalid claims have a positive
settlement value.9 5 Because of these costs, employers might hesi-
89 See, for example, Lior Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U Chi L
Rev 363, 379-80 (2008); Alexander, 141 U Pa L Rev at 172 (cited in note 77). For further
discussion of this general position, see Kelman, 53 Stan L Rev 833 (cited in note 75);
Epstein, Forbidden Grounds (cited in note 79); Bagenstos, 89 Va L Rev 825 (cited in note
79).
90 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan L Rev 223 (2000).
91 Strahilevitz, 75 U Chi L Rev at 379 (cited in note 89). As a further example, see 5
USC § 8104 (2006) (providing for vocational rehabilitation for permanently disabled indi-
viduals).
92 As it does. See 26 USC §§ 38, 51(d) (2006).
93 As it does. See the United States Department of Labor Federal Bonding Program
website, available at <http://www.bonds4jobs.com/index.html> (last visited Feb 10, 2009).
For a general discussion along these lines, see Scott A. Moss and Daniel A. Malin, Note,
Public Funding for Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrim-
ination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 Harv CR-CL L Rev 197 (1998).
94 See Bluestone and Ghilarducci, Making Work Pay at 23-24 (cited in note 41).
95 See John J. Donohue III and Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan L Rev 983, 1024 (1991); Jolls, 115 Harv L Rev at
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tate to hire women and people of color, especially because em-
ployers are much less vulnerable to hiring discrimination claims
than to claims from incumbent workers. 96 Does it follow that the
state should provide a subsidy to employers to offset the costs of
nondiscrimination, and thereby encourage it? Many would be
appalled at the thought.
There is also a more technocratic institutional design objec-
tion to shifting the delivery and funding of antidiscrimination
protections from the employer to the government. Certain goods
can be delivered only by an employer, or at least at much lower
cost. If what a worker needs is a ten-minute rest break to take
medication, there may be no way for the government to deliver
that good without involving the employer.97 Additionally, allow-
ing the employer to charge the government for the costs of nondi-
scrimination may open the door to fraud. Employers will have a
huge incentive to do what they would have done anyway but
claim otherwise and shift costs. Or they may inflate the cost of
antidiscrimination practices.
III. Low WAGES AS A FORM OF DISCRIMINATION?
I have argued that breaking out of the existing minimum
wage debate requires meeting two challenges: providing an ac-
count of the injustice of low wages and providing an account of
employers' responsibility for remedying this injustice through
paying higher wages. The similarity to challenges faced by anti-
discrimination law is highly suggestive, but no more than that:
the minimum wage might be justified for reasons that have no
bearing on antidiscrimination law, or vice versa, or both of them
might fall to challenges launched by law and economics. In this
Part and the next, I explore several approaches that would bring
together the justifications for antidiscrimination and minimum
wage law. Here, I briefly explore two ways of analyzing low wag-
es in terms of standard antidiscrimination concepts: a disparate
impact analysis using existing categories of race and gender, and
expansion of the protected categories to include economic class.
Although both have some merit, they tend to reproduce rather
than resolve the targeting issues discussed above. In Part IV, I
691-94 (cited in note 78).
96 See Donohue and Siegelman, 43 Stan L Rev 983 (cited in note 95); Jolls, 115 Harv
L Rev 642 (cited in note 78).
97 Compare Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 Harv J L & Gender 1
(2005) (discussing analogous issues in the context of parental leave).
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will develop a third possibility that shows some promise of avoid-
ing those problems.
I limit my attention to the issues of targeting, leaving aside
the allocation of costs between employers and the state. That
said, this first step is independently significant even if the
second challenge cannot be met. The absence of employer respon-
sibility would simply mean shifting to different institutional
means of addressing the underlying problem. And those institu-
tional means are not currently in place. Recall that the targeting
critique touts the EITC for excluding low-wage workers who are
not poor. If low-wage work is an injustice, the worker's poverty
status aside, then that alone would tell us that work-based anti-
poverty programs are not enough. And if the minimum wage is
not the solution, the answer may lie in other approaches like in-
dividualized wage subsidies.98
A. Low Wages as Imposing a Disparate Impact on
Protected Groups
Advocates for raising the minimum wage often note that
higher wages (setting aside any corresponding job losses) would
disproportionately benefit groups that antidiscrimination laws
are designed to protect.99 The flip side of this same point is that
low wages disproportionately harm these same groups, who are
segregated into low-wage occupations. Although it is difficult to
imagine successfully using Title VII of the Civil Rights Act100 or
the ADA to attack an employer's wage schedule for imposing a
disparate impact, a minimum wage nonetheless might be anc-
hored in underlying concerns about group stigmatization or sub-
ordination. By analogy, the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA")10 1 has been defended as a response to the disparate
impact on women that arises when employers deny leave, 102 even
though Title VII has not been construed to require such leaves. 10 3
I think there is something to this argument and will return
to it below. But two major limitations render it incomplete at
best.
98 See Phelps, Rewarding Work at 105 (cited at note 35).
99 Chasanov, No Longer Getting By (cited in note 32).
100 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (2006).
101 29 USC §§ 2601 et seq (2006).
102 See Nevada Department of Human Resources v Hibbs, 538 US 721 (2003).
103 Jolls, 115 Harv L Rev 642 (cited in note 78).
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First, if the goal is to equalize the economic standing of so-
cial groups, it is unclear why one would specifically target the
low end of the wage scale. Raising wages at the middle and up-
per ends of the distribution seems equally important. More fun-
damentally, why would we focus on wage levels at all, as opposed
to individual or household income levels? As with arguments for
the EITC relative to the minimum wage, if the underlying goal is
to raise the incomes of women or people of color, some explana-
tion is needed for doing so via the wage mechanism. Or, perhaps
we have some account of why wages specifically should be higher
than they are, independently of the consequences for the distri-
bution of incomes. But disparate impact alone does not provide
that account.
Second, a disparate impact analysis may miss harms that
cut across protected classes. Low-wage workers are disproportio-
nately women, but it doesn't follow that what's wrong with pay-
ing low wages to a man is that he is being treated like a woman.
That, however, is all we are left with if the race and gender dis-
tributional consequences of low wages are the sole basis for judg-
ing them objectionable. Conceptualizing the problem of low wag-
es as the sum of discrimination against a series of distinct groups
seems to stop short of capturing what these workers have in
common. To return to the wage theft analogy, imagine that em-
ployers steal from their female employees more often than from
male employees. Although it might represent an improvement,
we should not be satisfied if the employer corrects this imbalance
so as to steal at equal rates by gender. Similarly, imagine that
existing jobs continued to pay the same wages, but that the race
and gender composition of these jobs changed so that women and
people of color were no longer concentrated in the lowest paying
jobs. Would this eliminate the problem of low wages? If the an-
swer is no, as I think it must be, then race and gender disparate
impact are not getting at the whole problem. 10 4
104 This hypothetical is overdrawn in its simplifying assumption that race and gender
affect only the sorting of people into jobs and not the structuring of those jobs, including
their compensation. That assumption is false. Nonetheless, the basic point remains so
long as eliminating occupational segregation would still leave some jobs with wages that
are "too low," even if doing so would improve the wages and working conditions of jobs in
which women and people of color currently are concentrated. On wage-setting as a func-
tion of the characteristics of job occupants, see generally Kessler-Harris, A Woman's Wage
(cited in note 30); Roger Waldinger and Michael I. Lichter, How the Other Half Works:
Immigration and the Social Organization of Labor (California 2003); Paula England,
Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence (Aldine de Gruyter 1992).
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B. Low Wages as "Class" Discrimination
If the groups conventionally protected by antidiscrimination
law fail to map cleanly onto the contours of low-wage work, the
obvious solution is to add another group concept like economic
"class." Low-wage workers might then constitute a distinct
"working class" or similar designation. Increasing the wages of
the lowest-paid workers obviously benefits them relative to other
classes, again bracketing the perversity critique for now. In this
way, the minimum wage might be thought of as a narrow at-
tempt to incorporate economic class into antidiscrimination law,
much the way one might think of the FMLA as a narrow attempt
to protect caregivers as a group; all intersect massively with
race, gender, and disability but are not strictly reducible to them.
I doubt that this kind of class analysis can advance the ball
very far, even without considering the traditional hostility to
class analysis in U.S. politicolegal culture. 10 5 The targeting prob-
lems remain severe, for reasons related to the slipperiness of de-
fining class. 106 If class is defined in terms of present economic
status, 10 7 then it is still unclear why wage rates are a better cri-
terion than household income. If, instead, class is defined simply
by low wages, then the analysis becomes circular. It hardly adds
anything to say that paying low wages discriminates against the
class of low-wage workers. If paying low wages is itself wrongful,
then reframing the problem in terms of discrimination seems
superfluous. If, instead, membership in the class of people who
receive low wages is an independent matter of moral concern,
then we need some account of the nature of that moral concern
other than the correlation between low wages and poverty; 08
otherwise, we are back to the antipoverty rationale.
Roemer's analysis recounted earlier suggests a reconstruc-
tion of class in terms of unequal access to productive resources.
105 For discussions of this hostility, see Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in
American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S Cal L Rev 799
(2003); Athena D. Mutua, Introducing ClassCrits: From Class Blindness to a Critical
Legal Analysis of Economic Inequality, 56 Buff L Rev 859 (2008).
106 On competing conceptions of class in sociology, see Erik Olin Wright, ed, Ap-
proaches to Class Analysis (Cambridge 2005).
107 For an overview of attempts to incorporate economic discrimination into U.S. con-
stitutional law through concepts of wealth, income, and ability to pay, see Gerald L.
Neuman, Equal Protection, "General Equality," and Economic Discrimination from a U.S.
Perspective, 5 Colum J Eur L 281 (1999).
108 For instance, Marxian accounts tie class to labor exploitation. See Erik Olin
Wright, Foundations of a Neo-Marxist Class Analysis, in Erik Olin Wright, ed, Approach-
es to Class Analysis (Cambridge 2005).
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This approach to class, however, pulls the root of the problem
further away from the wage relation, or even from the lowest end
of the wage spectrum. If the basic problem is equalizing wealth
across classes, then the targeting critique returns with a ven-
geance. Regulating low wages might roughly target disinherited
employees and privileged employers, but it seems unduly roun-
dabout compared to focusing directly on the mechanisms by
which people unequally acquire capital.
IV. Low WAGES AS UNEQUAL EARNINGS CAPACITY
This Part proposes a new theory of the minimum wage that
draws upon my recent work in antidiscrimination theory.10 9 The
basic idea, familiar from liberal egalitarian theory, is that we are
only partly responsible for our own earnings capacity, for the
value of our labor to others. To a large degree, our earnings ca-
pacity is a function of morally arbitrary factors. To that extent,
inequalities in earnings capacity are unjust. However, it is im-
possible to measure earnings capacity, let alone break it down
into components that track our moral responsibility. The mini-
mum wage enacts a presumption that when wages fall below
some level, they are so low for morally arbitrary reasons. Man-
dating a higher wage brings us closer to a world of wage fairness.
A. Normative Foundations Shared with
Antidiscrimination Law
Before elaborating on this account of the minimum wage, let
me first make explicit the connection to conventional under-
standings of civil rights. In a forthcoming article, I propose a
theory of employment discrimination law that relies neither on a
corrective justice account of discriminatory intent nor on equaliz-
ing the status of groups. 110 Instead, the core concern of employ-
ment discrimination law is "membership causation": suffering
harm at work as a result of one's membership in a protected
class. That harm is inflicted when an employer acts with discri-
minatory intent. By taking the worker's race, sex, or disability
into account, the employer reaches a different decision depending
on the worker's group membership. This occurs regardless of
what motivated the employer to consider group membership,
whether it be animus or a desire to save money.
109 Zatz, Managing the Macaw (cited in note 1).
110 Id.
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The employer's discriminatory intent, however, is merely
one mechanism by which class membership can make a differ-
ence at work. The same thing occurs when an employer fails to
provide a reasonable accommodation. If I cannot operate a ma-
chine effectively because of my disability, then my employer may
be motivated to fire me because of my poor performance on the
machine, without considering my disability. And yet it is still the
case that I lose my job because of my disability, one step further
back in the causal chain. Perhaps, however, I could operate the
machine effectively, notwithstanding my disability, if only my
employer made reasonable modifications to the machine. In such
cases, making a reasonable accommodation or not makes the dif-
ference between keeping the job and losing it because of disabili-
ty.
Although membership causation identifies circumstances in
which an employee suffers the distinctive harm of employment
discrimination, it does not necessarily follow that the employer
bears responsibility for preventing or remedying that harm. In-
stead, that separate question is addressed by requirements like
discriminatory intent, "reasonableness" and undue hardship in
the reasonable accommodation context, and negligence standards
applied to employer efforts to prevent harassment. This bifurca-
tion between questions of harm and responsibility parallels the
two key questions for a theory of the minimum wage: "why care
about low wages?" and "why make the employer responsible for
raising them?"
Why should we care about membership causation? It pro-
vides a special case of the central problem in liberal egalitarian
theories of distributive justice in the Rawlsian tradition. These
theories hold that individuals' access to resources, and perhaps
specifically to employment, should not be a function of morally
arbitrary differences. Such theories have been labeled "luck ega-
litarianism,"11' though luck may not be the only source of morally
arbitrary difference. 1 2 Daniel Markovits suggests the term "re-
111 See Elizabeth Anderson, How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?, 9
Theoretical Inquiry L 239, 243 (2008).
112 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Egalitarianism, Choice-Sensitivity, and Accommodation,
in R. Jay Wallace, et al, eds, Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of
Joseph Raz 270 (Clarendon 2004).
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sponsibility-tracking egalitarianism,"' 1 3 which conveys more di-
rectly the foundation in respect for individuals' equal agency.
114
Membership in a protected group is a paradigmatic example
of such a morally arbitrary difference. Of course, the precise
scope of these concepts is contested in ways that matter tre-
mendously for the identification of protected groups, for instance
whether moral arbitrariness requires "immutability" or includes
matters of fundamental personal identity that are either con-
sciously chosen or at least subject to change. Nonetheless, the
general concept is reasonably clear, and it provides a common
thread connecting different forms of prohibited discrimination.
Membership in a protected group, however, is not the only
example of a morally arbitrary difference. Others arguably in-
clude differential childhood access. to nutrition, education, and
social capital as a result of the family, neighborhood, or nation in
which one was raised. Additional differences might involve na-
tive talent for forms of work valued in the marketplace, differ-
ences that do not possess the form or the magnitude to be medi-
calized as disability or even impairment.11 5 All of these affect the
wages one can command in the labor market.1 16
Why, then, does antidiscrimination law pick out for protec-
tion only membership in certain groups? This is a large and im-
portant problem that I cannot pursue adequately in this forum.
But some plausible arguments seem readily at hand. First, cer-
tain morally arbitrary considerations may, as a matter of social
fact, become the basis for systematic disadvantage, systematic in
the sense of affecting many people, affecting them repeatedly at
different moments and in different contexts, and affecting them
in a consistent direction. It might well be unfair for an employer
113 Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 Yale L J 2291,
2294-95 (2003).
114 Markovits and Shiffrin both argue that this underlying value may, in some cir-
cumstances, justify deviations from strictly responsibility-tracking institutions, even if
they are appropriate as a first approximation. See Shiffrin, Egalitarianism, Choice-
Sensitivity, and Accommodation (cited in note 112); Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarian-
ism and Political Solidarity, 9 Theoretical Inquiry L 271 (2008). This subtlety is not di-
rectly implicated by this discussion, though it may return through the analysis of em-
ployer responsibility that I have deferred. See Markovits, 9 Theoretical Inquiry L at 307
(cited in note 114).
115 Wax, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1443-44 (cited in note 81). See also Kelman and
Lester, Jumping the Queue (cited in note 82).
116 For a synthesis of some research in this area, see James J. Heckman, Schools,
Skills, And Synapses, 46 Econ Inquiry 289 (2008) (discussing findings that "about half of
the inequality in the present value of lifetime earnings is due to factors determined by
age 18").
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to discriminate against workers who prefer strawberry ice
cream, 117 but that does not yet make it a social problem large
enough to justify deploying against it the power and resources of
the state.
Additionally, and part of why one might hesitate before try-
ing to suppress such injustice, it can be very difficult to deter-
mine in individual cases whether or not some harm was caused
by a morally arbitrary factor. This is a particularly vexing fea-
ture of the factors identified above that may unjustly affect earn-
ings capacity, among other things. They often involve very long
causal chains stretching back to childhood and intertwining with
complex social processes. Moreover, they may be exceedingly dif-
ficult to disentangle from disadvantages for which individuals
ordinarily are held responsible, like how hard or diligently one
works. The relative difficulty of making such determinations
provides another possible reason to pay special attention to the
causal role of protected group membership, a more readily dis-
cernible subset of morally arbitrary influences. 18 Furthermore,
even with regard to such groups, it provides a reason to focus on
their influence when it is proximate to the ultimate harm. In an
individual case, it might well be that a racial incident in one's
childhood had significant effects on a series of subsequent events
decades later, but most often it would be impossible to prove it.
Indeed, the reluctance to trace such long causal chains arguably
provides one of the most significant limits on conventional anti-
discrimination law, which already struggles mightily with evi-
dentiary problems even in conceptually straightforward dispa-
rate treatment cases.
So, as a first step in the argument, we have a reason to think
that wages can be "too low" in a way that reflects a problem of
justice."9 At this point, "too low" simply means lower than they
would have been in the absence of morally arbitrary factors sup-
pressing earnings capacity. Conventional antidiscrimination law
117 For skepticism that it is unfair at all, see Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Owner-
ship (cited in note 19).
118 See Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 9 Geo Mason L Rev 145, 154 (2000); Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State (Temple
1984) (arguing that medical concepts of disability attempt, albeit with limited success, to
clarify the boundaries of personal responsibility for unemployment).
119 Shaviro rather scornfully rejects the possibility of any criterion for "just wages"
other than the actual outcome of existing market wage-setting practices. Shaviro, 64 U
Chi L Rev at 429-33 (cited in note 11). Widely accepted prohibitions on wage discrimina-
tion, from which I generalize here, demonstrate both the familiarity and the conceptual
plausibility of accounts of wage fairness that reconstruct market baselines.
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can be understood as attacking one particular, and particularly
important, form that this injustice can take. Thus, we also have a
deep connection to traditional civil rights law, not in the sense
that low wages are simply a form of discrimination, but rather in
the sense that they are unjust for the same underlying reasons
that discrimination is unjust.
Crucially, this first step provides an account of when wages
are too low that, in theory, avoids all the key targeting problems
afflicting the minimum wage from an antipoverty perspective. If
an airline pays male pilots $100 per hour and female pilots $90
per hour, the employer violates employment discrimination law.
It is simply irrelevant that $90 per hour is a high wage in the
total wage distribution, and that someone earning $90 per hour
is likely to have a relatively high income. The point is that, but
for their sex, the women would have been paid more. 120 The same
logic applies to other morally arbitrary factors. If someone earns
$90 per hour but would have earned $100 per hour had she not
been malnourished as a child or had her parents been able to
afford living somewhere with better schools, there is unfairness
to the worker. That injustice is independent of whether the
worker has other sources of income, the size of the household she
lives in, and the size of other household members' income. More-
over, it is independent of how many hours she works. 121 The
point is not her ultimate income over a month or a year, but ra-
ther what she has lost for morally arbitrary reasons.
B. From Low Wages to Minimum Wages
The argument so far has nothing special to say about mini-
mum wages, in which unfairness inheres in the absolute level of
the wage. Instead, in the nature of antidiscrimination law, the
concept of "low" wages described above was entirely relative. A
worker high in the wage distribution nonetheless might be paid
unfairly little. Similarly a worker low in the wage distribution
might be paid fairly. She might be paid less than other workers
because she has devoted less time, energy, and money to improv-
ing her skills or acquiring a good track record; because a particu-
120 Of course, it is not always clear that an employer would avoid discriminating by
leveling up rather than leveling down or something in between, but the law understanda-
bly shows little pity for the employer on this point.
121 Hours of work might or might not be fully her own responsibility, but that question
is conceptually distinct from the hourly rate. These issues may interact insofar as income
effects dominate substitution effects, in which case long hours might be a function of
unjustly low pay. Perhaps herein lies the beginning of a theory of overtime.
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lar job has nonpecuniary benefits that make up for low wages; or
because the worker is acting as a volunteer implicitly donating
her labor for less than she could earn elsewhere. 122
Because the injustice of low wages is a function of the rea-
sons for that rate, not its absolute level, any attempt to correct
this injustice with precision requires that we distinguish among
people who get paid the same wage. To do so, we need to know
why they receive that wage and not another. This is the same
basic evidentiary problem that bedevils antidiscrimination law.
We need. to distinguish between people fired based on their race
from those fired for other reasons.
Solving this evidentiary problem on a case-by-case basis is
hard enough in traditional antidiscrimination law, but it quickly
becomes hopeless when seeking to identify workers who receive
unfairly low pay for a broader range of morally arbitrary reasons.
Indeed, as noted earlier, this appears to be one reason to restrict
antidiscrimination protections to specific characteristics in the
first place. Even if we are confident that, all else equal, going to a
worse school on average leads to lower wages as an adult, we
could never analyze its impact in an individual case; the poten-
tial for variation among those from the same school is far too
high. Perhaps for one person, going to a better school would have
meant not learning to work as hard and later suffering for it, or
not having a particular inspiring experience, or becoming friends
with someone who later provided a crucial professional connec-
tion, or on and on. Assessing the hypothetical is just ridicul-
ous. 
123
Faced with this evidentiary Everest, we might just give up.
Doing so would mean letting countless injustices lie where they
fell but could not be seen. Or we could decide to muddle through.
That, I suggest, is how we might think of the minimum wage.
At some point, wages become low enough that we can infer
unfairness from the brute fact of the poor outcome. True, in any
individual case we cannot trace the mechanism with any preci-
sion. Nonetheless, the intuition is that if someone is making $2
122 Of course, all of these distinctions require a fleshed-out account of the scope of
responsibility for determinants of wages, including questions of native talent and respon-
sibility for one's own preferences. See, for example, Markovits, 112 Yale L J 2291 (cited in
note 113). For skepticism that such an account can succeed, see Ian Shapiro, Democratic
Justice 150-60 (Yale 2001).
123 For an analogous critique of conventional disparate treatment theory, see Kimber-
ly Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality,
83 Tex L Rev 167, 192-96 (2004).
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per hour, it probably is because she has gotten the short end of
the stick in some fashion, probably in many. 124 Res ipsa loquitor.
In contrast, if someone is making $90 per hour, one would re-
quire a more case-specific story before suspecting injustice, even
though it's a possibility.
Obviously these are rough generalizations. A minimum wage
will be underinclusive of cases of wage unfairness above the min-
imum. It also will be overinclusive of some cases below the min-
imum. To some extent, the latter problem might be addressed by
rules limiting the scope of covered employment relationships. For
instance, exclusions of trainees and volunteers might serve that
function. 125 But at bottom, even an imprecise minimum wage
may do a better job of preventing unjustly low wages than either
simply throwing up our hands or using more targeted laws that
require proof specific to identifiable individuals or groups. Some-
times a crude rule is better than an unworkable standard and
also better than doing nothing at all.
C. Comparisons to Other Arguments for a Minimum Wage
A theory along these lines has two primary virtues relative
to those I considered in Parts I and III. First, as already argued
above, it avoids the targeting critique by providing an analysis of
wage rates independent of personal and household income. Con-
sider a paradigmatic example that illustrates the EITC's supe-
rior targeting under an antipoverty rationale: the minimum
wage applies to work performed by a "secondary earner" married
to a high-earning spouse, but the spouse's low earnings would
not trigger EITC eligibility. Now the tables are turned: if the
problem to be addressed is low earnings capacity rather than
poverty, the minimum wage is well-targeted, and the EITC falls
far from the mark.126
124 Elsewhere, I suggest that a similar analysis may allow us to theorize disparate
theory in antidiscrimination law as a probabilistic method of identifying membership
causation when it cannot be identified case-by-case. See Zatz, Managing the Macaw (cited
in note 1).
125 The issue of coverage also raises a different sort of concern about underinclusive-
ness. The problem of unfairly low earnings capacity can arise outside of employment
relationships altogether, in the circumstances of genuine independent contractors or self-
employed people.
126 Of course, this is no argument against the EITC; poverty relief for the working
poor may well be a legitimate goal that the EITC implements admirably. The point is
simply that with regard to the different goal of responding to unfairly low earnings capac-
ity, the minimum wage may be better targeted.
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Second, it identifies the wrong of subminimum wages in a
way that organically explains why we set a wage floor rather
than intervening throughout the wage scale. This is itself an in-
stitutional design argument: the ultimate injustice in question
does occur throughout the scale, but because its incidence in-
creases as wages decline, the administrative case for interven-
tion at some point tips from con to pro. By justifying the device of
a wage floor, my argument differs from those grounded in the
intrinsically exploitative character of wage labor or a general
inequality of bargaining power between capital and labor. It also
distinguishes antidiscrimination arguments grounded in the ag-
gregate economic status of groups.
To put it more schematically, my proposed account combines
the virtues of the two leading types of theory discussed in Part I.
Like antipoverty theories, it explains a focus on low absolute
wages. And like critiques of inequality in the wage bargain, it
separates wages from income and households.
Furthermore, a theoretical grounding in responsibility-
tracking egalitarianism makes it possible to incorporate the key
insights of attempts to frame the minimum wage in the more
traditional antidiscrimination terms, those considered in Part
III. It is no accident that women, people of color, immigrants,
and people with disabilities are concentrated in the lowest wage
jobs. In some cases, the mechanisms underlying this fact can be
attacked directly through traditional antidiscrimination law
theories. But when these theories exhaust the evidentiary capac-
ity of employment discrimination law, the minimum wage can
serve as a kind of civil rights safety net, catching some of the
cases that would otherwise slip through. While race and gender
inequality are not the only cause of unfairly low wages, they are
important ones that a minimum wage can address in a fashion
that complements traditional antidiscrimination law. Additional-
ly, addressing the broad spectrum of morally arbitrary sources of
disadvantage captures aspects of a "class" analysis. It takes se-
riously ways that socioeconomic subordination and marginaliza-
tion may reproduce themselves across generations, but without
conceptually separating these from processes grounded in race,
gender, or disability.' 27
127 An important question is the extent to which wage inequality would disappear in
the presence of just institutions more generally, including those governing the intergene-
rational transmission of wealth, education, and so forth. It may be impossible or unwise
to eliminate all of the ways in which even just inequalities among adults give rise to
unjust inequalities among their children, see generally Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at
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D. How Low is Too Low?
My argument thus far has focused on the basic institutional
design choice between wage regulation and tax-and-transfer
schemes. Even if some kind of minimum wage is justified, the
particulars remain to be fleshed out. I already have touched
briefly on some aspects of the scope of coverage. But the most
obvious question is how high should a minimum wage be? Al-
though I do not aim to answer that question here, viewing the
minimum wage in terms of unfairly low earnings capacity rather
than poverty reduction has at least one negative implication of
note. Not surprisingly, at stake in a theory of the minimum wage
is not simply whether a general policy can be justified but also, if
so, how it should be implemented.
If I am right about why we should have a minimum wage at
all, then the size of that wage should not be pegged directly to
achieving a minimally adequate standard of living for a house-
hold solely dependent on that wage. On my view, a minimum
wage is not a family wage. It is not necessarily a "living wage." It
could be more than that. Or it could be less.
I hasten to add that wage fairness is not the whole of eco-
nomic justice. That is the sense in which I think the institutional
design critique is well taken. There is every reason to think that
economic justice is a complex affair with many interlocking
parts. It may well be, for instance, that publicly-funded family
allowances should support parents, that we should equalize
access to unearned wealth by instituting a universal basic in-
come, and that we should have a residual safety net for individu-
als whose resources fall short despite all of this. All of these
could properly co-exist with a minimum wage.
I see no reason not to smile on a world in which households
bundle together resources from multiple sources rather than re-
lying exclusively on one person's wage. To think otherwise
strikes me as excessively beholden to a basically conservative
model of masculinist voluntarism, one built on the fantasy of the
"independent" male breadwinner operating in a private market
sealed off from the state. Of course, to the extent that model still
holds sway in practice or in politics, tactical concession to it may
Odds with Equality? The Legal Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S Cal L Rev 1
(2008), or to eliminate all inequalities arising from differences in native talent. See Mar-
kovits, 112 Yale L J 2291 (cited in note 113).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
be for the best, but we should not allow that to sow confusion as
to ultimate goals.
V. CONCLUSION
In his important article about the place of reasonable ac-
commodation mandates within antidiscrimination law, Samuel
Bagenstos rejects the widespread distinction drawn between
"core" civil rights protections and distinctly "redistributive" ac-
commodations.' 28 Instead, "[a]ccommodation mandates like the
one in the ADA serve the same fundamental interests as do anti-
discrimination requirements; they impose costs that cannot be
meaningfully distinguished from those imposed by antidiscrimi-
nation requirements; and they target conduct that is normatively
similar to that targeted by antidiscrimination requirements.' '129 I
believe that this general view can be extended further, breaking
down barriers not only within employment discrimination law
but also between it and other (though not necessarily all) areas
of labor and employment law. And just as Bagenstos hopes to
provide the intellectual foundation for solidarity between disabil-
ity rights activists and "traditional" civil rights constituencies
organized around race and gender, I hope that we can go further
and identify the common challenges and aspirations that too of-
ten march under the separate banners of "labor" and "civil
rights."
Subminimum wages plausibly are wrong for the same kinds
of reasons that employment discrimination is wrong. Both deny
people what my colleague Seana Shiffrin has termed an "equal
opportunity for meaningful freedom."1 30 That suggests we might
think of the minimum wage as a civil rights statute in a robust
sense, and not simply as a tool of antipoverty policy. And we can
do so while neither reducing economic disadvantage to our socie-
ty's stratification by race, gender, disability, and other estab-
lished categories of civil rights protection (or vice versa), nor
treating that stratification as fundamentally unlike injuries of
class manifested in the labor market.
In short, we can clear the first hurdle I identified above-
specifying the injustice of low wages-without falling back on
theories of intrinsically exploitative labor markets or vaguely
128 Bagenstos, 89 Va L Rev at 913 (cited in note 79).
129 Id at 922.
130 Shiffrin, Egalitarianism at 273 n 5 (cited in note 112).
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defined unequal bargaining power. Doing so meets the targeting
critique of the minimum wage.
There remains the second half of the institutional design cri-
tique of the minimum wage: that employers are the wrong party
to bear the program's costs. In the antidiscrimination context,
the law demands that employers restructure their workplaces (to
a degree) in order to facilitate access by (accommodate) members
of subordinated groups. The minimum wage likewise demands
that employers restructure a specific practice-their wage
scale-to facilitate access to a fair wage. In both cases, it is the
employee's claim on work (under certain conditions, wages in-
cluded) that drives the argument, not misdeeds by the employer.
In this way, the minimum wage has the same basic form as an
accommodation mandate.
But why should the employer be the one to pay for these ac-
commodations, whether they are the incremental cost of chang-
ing workplace policies, facilities, or equipment or the incremental
cost of raising wages to the minimum? Moreover, won't employ-
ers simply respond by avoiding workers who trigger these protec-
tions, or by taking it out on them in some other way?
On this point, too, I take my cue from Bagenstos: "I do not
object to the statement that both antidiscrimination and accom-
modation requirements alike must be justified in a manner that
takes full account of the incidence and distributive effects of their
implicit taxes and subsidies. Indeed, I believe that the most ef-
fective way for advocates of either antidiscrimination or accom-
modation to maintain support for these regimes (and I consider
myself an advocate of both) is to confront those effects carefully
and directly."131 I would simply include the minimum wage in
this statement and emphasize that the same basic challenge ap-
plies across the board.
I will conclude with three preliminary thoughts about this
remaining challenge. First, the institutional design advantages
of the tax system generally, and the EITC specifically, substan-
tially weaken once wage levels become the primary focus. Be-
cause of the current structure of the income tax, the IRS has an
advantage over employers when it comes to collecting annual
income data from all sources, and on a household basis. Employ-
ers don't necessarily know about an individual worker's other
income sources, let alone her family members', but employers do
know how much they pay. Moreover, employers know how they
131 Bagenstos, 89 Va L Rev at 921 (cited in note 79).
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calculate the amount of pay from wage rates and hours of work,
something they track as a matter of monitoring employee per-
formance. In contrast, the IRS and other government agencies
can track total earnings well but generally do not have indepen-
dent access to hours and rates.13 2 Therefore, employers may have
superior institutional competence to respond to wages as opposed
to income.
Second, wages and state transfers are not interchangeable
even if they possess the same dollar value. 133 Instead, the social
meaning of the wage is such that workers may be deprived of
equal respect if their work is valued too little, a disrespect that
cannot be cured by a payment from a third party. If so, raising
wages would be more effective than government transfers.
Whether this point matters depends on specifying more precisely
the injustice of low wages: is it simply that workers are deprived
of an equal opportunity to gain access to money, or is it that they
are deprived of participating on particular terms in a richer rela-
tionship of economic and social interconnection? The latter point
replicates with regard to wages the terms of an established de-
bate over access to employment: is there any reason for the state
to guarantee access to jobs or only to guarantee access to in-
come?13 4 The reasons for granting independent significance to
wages might also provide a noninstrumental basis for placing
some duties on employers. For instance, those reasons might in-
volve insisting that employment is not purely an arms-length
relationship but rather brings with it some obligations of mutual
regard.135 Something like that appears to be the intuition behind
the old rallying cry that "the labor of a human being is not a
commodity."1 36
132 If the government pays a wage supplement to either the employer or employee,
both parties will have an incentive to collude in the fraudulent inflation of hours and
deflation of wage rates. Alstott, 108 Yale L J at 1043-44 (cited in note 35). Falsification of
hours is a serious problem in the minimum wage context, too, but at least there workers
and employers have opposing interests.
133 See Viviana A. Zelizer, Payments and Social Ties, 11 Sociological F 481 (1996);
Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (Princeton 1997).
134 See, for example, Richard J. Arneson, Is Work Special? Justice and the Distribution
of Employment, 84 Am Pol Sci Rev 1127 (1990); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Race, Labor,
and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72 Fordham L Rev 1643 (2004); William
E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69
Fordham L Rev 1821 (2001).
135 Consider Kennedy, 41 Md L Rev 563 (cited in note 55); Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 Phil & Pub Aff 205
(2000).
136 Clayton Act, 15 USC § 17 (2000). Compare Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Com-
modities 108 (Harvard 1996) (suggesting that the minimum wage is an example of "in-
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Third, there remains the vexing problem of perversity: even
if employers rightly bear some responsibility for paying higher
wages, will their successful attempts to evade that responsibility
render the policy counterproductive? I worry that objections of
this sort permit a heckler's veto. In the employment discrimina-
tion context, the theory is that mandating costly protections for
women, people of color, and people with disabilities leads to hir-
ing discrimination against them. That's a reality to be faced, but
it may counsel intensifying enforcement against hiring discrimi-
nation and implementing other means to counteract it. When one
person's free speech (access to nondiscriminatory working condi-
tions) provokes heckling or violence (hiring discrimination), we
often think that the proper response is not to withdraw the
speaker's protection (scale back antidiscrimination law) but in-
stead to suppress or neutralize the heckling. Such efforts will be
costly, but so what? That is just the general problem of pursuing
distributive justice and rejecting a market baseline. The persua-
siveness of the perversity argument seems ultimately to depend
on normative sympathy for the heckler (who discriminates in one
way in order to avoid the costs imposed by the ban on discrimi-
nating in another way), or on prioritizing those harmed by the
heckler over those whose protection provokes the heckling. 137
In the minimum wage context, the analogous argument
would go like this: Yes, it is unfair if paying just wages to some
causes others to lose their jobs. The latter group lacks employ-
ment for reasons beyond their own responsibility. Something
must be done. But surely cutting the minimum wage is not the
only tool available to fight involuntary unemployment. That tool
leaps to mind only if we privilege a market baseline that lacks
wage regulation. That baseline, however, is exactly what liberal
egalitarians reject.
Instead, the problem of involuntary unemployment created
by labor and employment regulation-to whatever extent it oc-
curs at all-is simply a special case of involuntary unemploy-
ment more generally. Taking the perversity argument seriously
might well lead us toward more robust labor and employment
complete commodification").
137 Compare Strahilevitz, 75 U Chi L Rev at 376-77 (cited in note 89) (criticizing at-
tempts to prevent discrimination against ex-offenders because employers may respond by
statistically discriminating against African American men but supporting analogous
attempts to prevent discrimination based on HIV status even though it may lead to sta-
tistical discrimination against gay men and African Americans).
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policies that include job creation and other active labor market
practices, rather than toward deregulation.
What I have said here is no more than a beginning. It is en-
tirely possible that these arguments will lead to dead ends. But
for those of us who fear that the existing minimum wage debate
is leading us to walk in ever smaller circles,13 trying to break out
in a new direction could be worth the effort and the risk. That
would be all the more true if doing so made it easier to envision
an integrated set of civil rights, labor, and social welfare policies.
138 See Levin-Waldman, 3 Rhetoric & Pub Aff 131 (cited in note 12).
